

South Sudanese Crisis and Its Foreign Intervention, 2013-2021

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Abstract: The purpose of this study was to explore the dynamics of South Sudanese crisis from 2013 to 2021. Descriptive research design that anchored on the judgmental sampling technique was adopted. The secondary sources (books, journal articles, conference papers, internet materials and monographs) were sourced from Nigerian libraries and internet, subjected to content analysis, before qualitatively analyzed for the study. Findings revealed that political exclusion, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, corruption and weak institutions triggered grievances that led to December 2013 South Sudanese crisis. The crisis had impacted negatively on security, humanitarian needs, human rights, as well as economy. United Nations Mission in South Sudan, Inter Governmental Authority on Development, African Union Mission in South Sudan, United States, Canada, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea had intervened. Though these findings have deepened the understanding of Group theory, the fear of South Sudanese crisis reoccurring immediately after general election in 2024 is looming. The study recommends, rotational presidency, devolution of power, mental disarmament and development assistance to avert the incoming crisis.

Keywords: Agreement, arms, crisis, grievances, group, insecurity, intervention, impacts, oil, theory.

INTRODUCTION

South Sudan constitutes part of Horn of Africa and is centrally located in Northeast Africa. The capital of South Sudan is Juba and it has 13 million people that spread among 10 states namely; Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei Unity, Upper Nile, Lakes, Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Northern Bahr el Ghazal. South Sudan is bordered by Sudan on the North, Ethiopia on the East, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Uganda on the South, and Central African Republic on the West (South Sudan Country Profile, 2018). Unarguably, Southern region of Sudan had witnessed three civil wars. The first civil war started in 1955 and ended in 1972, while the second civil war began in 1983 and ended in 2005. These two civil wars were fought between North and South Sudan. Unfortunately, the third civil war that came as a result of leadership crisis between President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar was fought within South Sudan. This civil war started on 2013 and ended in 2020, even though the state is still not completely peaceful (International Crisis Group, 2021).

Added to this, Republic of South Sudan came into existence as a result of peace accord brokered by Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a regional organization that comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) intervened in the second civil war between North and South in 2005 and brought the warring parties into an agreement. The North was represented by National Congress Party (NCP), while the South was led by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on 9th January, 2005. This led to an end of the second civil war. However, the interesting aspect of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was the general election, which Sudan must conduct in 2010, and the referendum for southern secession, which the both parties agreed on 2011. The Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that brokered that peace monitored its implementation throughout the five years' duration (2005-

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2010). Unfortunately, John Garang, the leader of Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) lost his life through helicopter crash, after signing the agreement in 2005 (Blanchard, 2016).

Salva Kiir was the Vice President of the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM), Riek Machar was the Military Commander of Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA). Salva Kiir assumed the position of President of Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), while Riek Machar continued maintaining his position as the Military Commander of Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) throughout the period of transition. The general election was conducted in 2010 while the referendum was also held in 2011 in line with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Waal (2016) confirmed that a referendum was conducted on 9th January 2011, 98.83 percent of the entire southern population favoured independence. Salva Kiir became the President of the Republic of South Sudan Riek Machar was appointed the Vice President. General election was scheduled to hold in 2015; hence, the Unity Government had five years' duration. However, throughout 2011 to 2013, there was distrust between President Kiir and his Vice President Machar, hence, the newly emerged state experienced fragile peace. As Johnson (2014) asked:

What, then, is really happening in South Sudan?... two parallel conflicts that have been developing since 2005 have now converged, one in the governing party, the SPLM, and one in the army the SPLA. Both have origin in unresolved tensions following the split in the SPLA in the 1990s, and the incomplete reintegration of the anti-SPLA forces into the SPLA after 2005 (p.302).

The fact remains that Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was mainly concerned with issue of self-determination not the nation building or the internal crisis in South Sudan. President Kiir comes from Dinka ethnic group while Vice President Machar is a native of Nuer ethnic group. The two ethnic groups are not in good term following the Bor massacre of 1991, which Machar was alleged to have masterminded. Therefore, the two enemies coming together to form a government could be seen as a disservice to the people of Southern Sudan. Vice President Machar complained bitterly about the government, especially on corruption, pervasive tribalism and nepotism at all levels of government including civil service and army. The delay in payment of public sector salary, ill treatment by government security forces, and above all lack of consultation on national issues. He accused the government of being dictatorial (Blanchard, 2016). International Crisis Group (2011) also added that:

At the political level, SPLM domination and constraints on political space remain sources of long-simmering discontent. Opposition voices complain that CPA unduly elevated the SPLM and inadvertently sowed the seeds for one party rule. They argue that the accord's power-sharing formula – which mandated 70 percent SPLM control of the executive and legislative branches at both state and government of South Sudan (GoSS) level – unfairly... undermined the development of multi-party democracy. (p.2)

President Kiir accused Vice President Machar of power thirsty and decided to embark on cabinet reshuffle in July 2013. Vice President Machar was replaced with Taban Deng while other cabinet members such as Oyayi Deng, John Luk Jok, Majok D' Agoot, Gier Chuang, Deng Alor, Pagan Amum, Peter Adwok, Alfred Lado, Cirino Hiting Kosti Manibe and Chol Tong were dismissed from cabinet. On 14th December 2013, National Liberation Council (NLC), the highest policy making organ of SPLM, had a meeting. In that meeting, President Kiir accused Vice President, Machar and other dismissed cabinet members of planning coup. They were all arrested, except Machar who escaped to the neighbouring Sudan. International Crisis Group (2014) equally posited that, "most government officials maintain that Machar was planning to take power by force,... believe the failure of the wider international community to condemn a coup attempt has encouraged him" (p.11). Contradicting the government position on the failed coup, the United States debunked the coup attempt and urged the different factions in the leadership crisis in South Sudan to give peace a chance (Blanchard, 2016).

Despite this pleading from the United States, on 15th December 2013, genocide erupted in Juba and its environs. The dismissed Vice President Machar's ethnic group; Nuer was targeted by the government forces loyal to President Kiir. Blanchard (2016) reported that, the initial fighting that erupted in Juba, the nation's capital between the two ethnic groups; Dinka and Nuer quickly spread to Jonglei and other oil producing states of Unity and Upper Nile. The military was divided along ethnic lines. Paul Malong, a Dinka was the Commander of Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) who was loyal to President Kiir while Johnson Olony, a native of Nuer and a loyalist to Vice President Machar became the Commander of Sudan People's Liberation Army– in Opposition (SPLA-IO). International Crisis Group (2014) hinted that, about 50,000 people from the two ethnic groups lost their lives on 15th December 2013 in Juba. However, Nyadera (2018) alerted that the Nuer had more deaths than the Dinka. A revenge attacks also took place in Akobo County which is dominated by Neur. Natives of Dinka, especial civilians, government officials (civil servants) and some security operatives took shelter in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) based in Akobo in order to avert reprisal attacks. Regrettably, they were not safe. International Crisis Group (2014) recalled that:

A revenge attack was organized and civilians, including a United Nations international staff who was not inside the mission's compound, were indiscriminately killed... Inside; men, women and children were attacked with machetes, axes, handguns and semi-automatic weapons, in full sight of peacekeepers. During the attack...

peacekeepers were nowhere to be seen... it took nearly 25 minutes for UN troops to return fire – when they did, some of the attackers were killed and the rest fled (p.26).

Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) intervened in January 2014 and invited Kiir and Machar for peace talks in Addis Ababa; the capital of Ethiopia. International Crisis (2014) highlighted that “Kiir and Machar sent delegations to Addis Ababa for peace talks in early January, but despite the 23rd January cessation of hostilities agreement conflict continues” (p.2). On 6th July 2015 conflict erupted between opposition forces and government forces in Juba. This led to the death of many soldiers. United Nations officials were wounded and United States Embassy was attacked. Blanchard (2016) added that, “on July 10 and 11, 2015 violence was reportedly intense in parts of the capital, including area near UN base that sheltered more than 28,000 civilians and UN staff, several civilians inside the base were killed, UN staff were wounded and two Chinese peacekeepers were killed” (p.3).

Regrettably, South Sudanese crisis did not discriminate victims of its attacks. Even United Nations Mission in South Sudan (Peace Keepers) and Humanitarian Workers such as International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Medical Corps (IMC), Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), United Nations International Children Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), among others were attacked. The attacks on the humanitarian workers created fear and discouraged them from rendering services to the needy. Oxfam (2018) decried that:

South Sudan is considered one of the most dangerous places in the world to be an aid worker... humanitarian access impediments are on the rise... at least 97 humanitarian aid workers have been killed since the start of the conflict... This is increasingly difficult and dangerous environment, paired with rising administrative hurdles and pressure, is having serious implications for humanitarian operations (pp.8-9).

Comity of nations cannot be silent over these atrocities committed by forces loyal to President Kiir and Vice President Machar, hence on 27th January 2017, African Union, Inter Governmental Authority on Development, and the United Nations, jointly issued a statement condemning the attacks in South Sudan, and stated its readiness to hold those responsible to account (United Nations Security Council, 2018). On 2nd February 2018, European Union imposed sanctions on Lieutenant General Paul Malong, Lieutenant General Malek Reuben Riak and Lieutenant General Michael Makuei. Their assets were frozen and permission to travel to any member state of European Union was banned (United Nations General Assembly, 2018). Similarly, on 2nd February, 2018, the United States imposed an arm embargo on all parties to the conflict in South Sudan; “citing the continued use of military force by the government and armed opposition despite the 21st December 2017 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, the continued obstruction of United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) from fulfilling its mandate and the continued violence against civilian and humanitarian workers” (United Nations General Assembly, 2018, pp. 4-5) as the reason for the sanctions. John Kerry, the former Secretary of State warned President Kiir’s government that, “legitimacy is not a presumed right of any government” while Susan Rice, the former National Security Adviser (2015) decried that:

The government and the rebels are committing appalling crimes against innocent women, children and the elderly. President Kiir and Riek Machar and their cronies are personally responsible for this new war and self-inflicted disaster... only leaders on both sides can end this violence. Yet, President Kiir and Riek Machar would rather haggle over personal power and wealth than agree on solutions...

Questions that need answers are:

- i. Which theoretical framework can effectively explain South Sudanese crisis and its foreign intervention?
- ii. What are the main grievances that trigger South Sudanese crisis?
- iii. What are the impacts of the South Sudanese crisis?
- iv. How did international community intervene in South Sudanese crisis?

The first section of this study is the theoretical framework while the second section is the materials and methods of the research. The third section deals with the grievances that triggered South Sudanese crisis. The fourth section is concerned with the impact analysis of South Sudanese crisis. The fifth section is foreign intervention in South Sudanese crisis while conclusion and recommendations constitute the sixth section before references.

Group Theory

Bentley (1948) defined group as “a certain portion of the men of the society, taken, however, not as a physical mass cut off from other masses of men, but as a mass (of) activity, which does not preclude the men who participate in it from participating likewise in many other group activities” (cited in Varma, 2011, p.163). Similarly, Truman (1964) analyzed group as, “a collection of individuals which on the basis of one or more shared attitude, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied in the shared attitudes...” (cited in Varma, 2011, p.164). In the same vein, Johari (2011) hinted that, “the group theorists, as they are called, take it for granted that society is a mosaic of numerous groups living in interaction with each other

(p.310). In other words, groups are many in every human society, and they are constantly interacting with one another. As Isaak (1984) argued, "...group exists when men with shared interest organize, interact and seek goals through the political process. The key notions are "interaction" or "relationship", "interest" and "process or activity" (p.26).

All this indicates that the first concept of group theory is interaction. According to Johari (2011) group theorists (Bentley 1948 and Truman 1964) regarded society as a mosaic of groups living in numerous constant interactions with one another. Johari (2011) also argued that, "... a group can emerge only when the interactions among its individual members are both relatively frequent and sufficiently patterned to produce directional activity" (p.311). Added to this, is the opinion that, in any given society, groups are numerous; an individual is free to join two or more groups at the same time. The major point here is the activity which the group performs, not the association itself. As Varma (2011) explained further that, "same individual can belong to various groups, also makes it clear that the activity, particular to the group was more important than its structural composition" (p.163). The next concept of group theory is interest. It is important to note that interest binds an individual to a group. A group exists in a social system that allows individual to express his desire and protect his interest at any time. Bentley (1948) saw interest as an important factor that is central to the explanation of group behavior. Varma (2011) also hinted that, "interest is a shared attitude concerning a claim or claims to be made by one group upon certain other group in a social system" (p.163). Truman's (1964) understanding of groups is anchored also on the notion of interest. In the same vein, Ray (2009) added that, "every group is basically an interest group" (p.19).

Since groups are numerous in the social system, individual is free to join any group of his choice, despite the fact that resource is scarce. The resource scarcity brings conflict among groups in the society due to insurmountable interest. As Johari (2011) asserted, "... the competing groups that make up society...involved in the process of interaction and competition and the existence of the divergent lines of conflict guarantee that all individual groups are kept in check by the simultaneous activities of other groups" (p.313). Despite competition that occur as a result of scarce resources, social system survived stress. Bentley (1948), identified government as the next concept of the group theory. It serves as a mediator of conflict and the stabilizer of the social system. Ray (2009) argued that, "...government is the mediator in the struggle among groups, and the source of rules and restraints" (p.19). In the same vein, Truman (1964) cited in Varma (2011) also posited that, "government functions to establish and maintain a measure of order in the relationships among groups" (p.166). Government contains groups that are drawn from the social system and represent various interests. This means that government is also an interested party in any group conflict. As Isaak (1984) argued, "governmental institutions are groups of special kind... because they have interest and compete with other groups" (p.268).

Relating this to the subject matter, it is worthy to note that South Sudanese crisis that erupted on 15th December 2013, attracted both state and non-state actors, which represent groups as stated in the theory. The state actor that was in charge of South Sudanese's government was the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). President Salva Kiir led the group. Its military wing was Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA), which Paul Malong was the commander. Vice President Rick Machar was the head of the opposition group which was known as Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) while its military wing; Sudan People's Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO) was commanded by Johnson Olony. There was another Sudan People Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) that was loyal to Taban Deng. National Democratic Movement (NDM) led by Lam Akol, and National Salvation Front (NSF) led by Thomas Swaka. All were violent groups in South Sudanese crisis. Militias were also recruited by government and opposition groups. However, "with the exception of the SPLA-IO, these groups... have regional strongholds, and until the signing of the 2017 cessation of hostilities agreement, opposition had also been fighting among themselves (United Nations General Assembly, 2018. P.3). In line with the first concept, which is interaction, it is worthy to note that these groups interacted with one another for the purpose of gaining independence from Sudan.

Equally important is the fact that, all of them were members of the same group; Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), before that crisis erupted in 2013. They cooperated and fought against the government of Sudan, under the leadership of President Omar al Bashir, until Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005. Despite this cooperation and understanding before the independence on 9th July, 2011, President Salva Kiir's ethnic group (Dinka) constituted the majority in post-independence South Sudanese government. Minority groups like South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), headed by Baping Montail, South Sudan Patriotic Movement/Army (SSPM/A), led by Hussein Akoi, including Taban Julu's People's Democratic Movement (PDM) were ignored in the formation of post-independence government. Dinka (Kiir's ethnic group) who were member of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) were majority that occupied the post-independence offices. As International Crisis Group (2011) stated:

President Kiir and other senior SPLM officials have pledged that the ruling party intends to establish a more broad-based transitional government after CPA expires... At present SPLM members occupy the presidency and

Vice President, 88 percent of ministerial posts, and 94 percent of legislature assembly seat including speakership, and the party commands the loyalty of the army leadership. (p.7).

Added to political exclusion was the economic alienation, which the oil producing areas was experiencing under the government of President Salva Kiir. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) stipulated that 2 percent of oil derivation revenue should be shared to the oil producing areas; Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei, and Central Equatoria states. Regrettably, President Kiir refused to share the oil wealth with the oil producing areas, nor care for the environmental pollution that come with oil exploitation. As Patey (2010) noted, "... despite incoming oil revenues, many of the well-intended and hard-negotiated provisions of the CPA were not implemented in practice-neither by the Government of National Unity (GONU), by the oil companies, nor by the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) (p.627). International Crisis Group (2021) equally maintained that, "...the political elites desire to control the country's oil revenues... exacerbated its deep ethno-political and regional division (p.1). Regretting the violent contestation for power in South Sudan, Enough (2019) decried that;

Oil production in South Sudan has contributed to violence... Oil-producing areas and infrastructure have repeatedly been object of violent contest among competing armed actors, their proxies, and their sponsors. These areas and assets have been captured and held or destroyed with the use of violence- whether by government forces... or non-government armed actors.... Violent conflict has continued between those who seized control and those who lost control of the oil producing areas... (p.16).

All this explain interest (in this case oil) as a major concept in group theory. Furthermore, it was the combination of political exclusion and control of oil revenue that ignited the South Sudanese crisis that led to the intervention of Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), United States and European Union among others. Inter-Governmental Authority on Development on 23rd January 2014 invited President Kiir and Vice President Machar to Addis Ababa for peace talks. They were able to secure the release of the political detainees and appealed for cessation of hostilities among the armed groups in August 2015, Inter Governmental Authority on Development initiated another peace talks that led to the return of Vice President Machar to Juba in April 2016. Vice President Machar left Juba again in July, 2016, following deadly clash between his security guards and the presidential guards in Juba. The regional organization, Inter Government Authority on Development, continued persuading Machar, until he finally returned back to Juba in February 2020 to be part of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU). Machar maintained his position as First Vice President pending the outcome of the forthcoming general elections in 2024 while Taban Deng is the Second Vice President. Government of United States of America had also intervened in that crisis through humanitarian assistance, "...the United States has invested over \$11 billion in the country since 2005. That level of United States support is unprecedented in Sub-Saharan Africa, and represents one of the largest United States foreign aid investments globally in the past decade." (p.17). This explanation confirms government as the last concept of group theory

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This study used descriptive design that depended on secondary sources (books, journal articles, monographs, conference papers, internet materials among others) of data collection. These documentary materials were sourced from Nigerian libraries and internet subjected to content analysis before adopted into the study qualitatively. The researcher used qualitative method of data analysis, in order to embark on an in-depth study of South Sudanese crisis. Indeed, this has assisted immensely in expanding frontiers of knowledge for future research.

In addition, the population of this study was drawn from Dinka, Nuer, Zande, Bari, Shilluk, among other ethnic groups. The sample of the study concentrated on Dinka and Nuer. The choice of Dinka and Nuer was judgmental in view of the fact that, the principal contestants for power (President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Marchar) are from Dinka and Nuer respectively. In the same vein, the crisis focused on Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile States that constitutes Greater Upper Nile region where Vice President Riek Marchar hail from the Upper Nile Region hosts South Sudanese oil wells hence the epicenter of the crisis. Though South Sudanese crisis has attracted global attention, regrettably scarcity of reading materials on South Sudanese crisis generates gap in extant literature and create opportunity for unfounded argument. It is hoped that, this study would bridge that gap and further assists public commentators in their argument.

Grievances that Triggered South Sudanese Crisis

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 that led to the birth of Republic of South Sudan on 9th July 2011, did not adequately addressed the issue of power sharing among the different ethnic groups in South Sudan. It should also be recalled that this issue of ethnic identity was the major reason late John Garang formed Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) as an opposition force to liberate the southern region from the northern region. The north dominated both the economic and political space of the entire state. As Yionen (2005) put it, "... John Garang, a southerner... a member of southern elite... was unhappy about the increasingly Islamic zeal of the government and the political and economic depression of the south" (p.120). Garang who lost his life in 2005 was a native of Dinka that has

35 percent of the entire population of about 13 million people. President Salva Kiir that succeeded him is also from Dinka. Nuer is the second largest group in South Sudan with about 15 percent of the population. Vice President, Riek Machar is a native of Nuer. The remaining 50 percent of the entire population split among ethnic groups that are more than 60 (Nault & Levitt, 2017). Tonleu (2018) also added that, “Christians account for about 60 percent of the population, followed by animists, and a small minority of Muslims” (p.1).

One would have expected Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that brokered peace through Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), to give special cognizance to the ethnic and religious identity while sharing power. Regrettably, this was not the case. The major ethnic group, Dinka dominated the entire political space. President Salva Kiir, a Dinka appointed about 42 percent of his cabinet members from Dinka and awarded government contracts to his ethnic group members. Kessels, Durner and Schwartz (2016) alerted that, “other ethnic groups have accused the government of tribalism, including rampant nepotism and marginalization from national platforms and resources” (p.38). The smaller ethnic groups; especially Nuer, Zande, Bari, including Shilluk who had sacrificed both materials and human for the actualization of South Sudan’s independence cannot be happy nor quiet. They have to fight back for the reclaim of the state. As International Crisis Group (2021) explained, further that:

There remains deeply rooted tribal animosity. This has been identified as one of the ongoing causes of ethnic conflicts, created by distinct identity clashes and perceived dominance in social and political space. Some communities thus feel superior and other feel inferior and marginalized... the loose alliance that held the ruling party together began to unravel as the clique associated with Kiir home area and Dinka kin tightened its grip on the lever of government and the party. As power became concentrated in fewer hands, this circle grew more prone to wielding repression and violence in order to keep it (pp. 3-4).

Expectedly, the minority ethnic groups cannot relent effort hence, circle of violence must surely be the outcome. As Mohammed, Richter, Monk and Yamamoto (2018) stated, “as a result of high exclusion and escalating attacks by government forces towards minority ethnic groups, conflict will continue to deteriorate as long as the barriers to national cohesion are not addressed” (p.3).

This crisis would not have escalated and further engulfed the entire Equatoria, Unity Upper Nile and Jonglei States if small arms and light weapons were adequately controlled by the Kiir’s government. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 did not address the issue of small arms proliferation in South Sudan which was caused by 40 years prolonged war between north and south. As Mueller (2013) stated, “there was no provision about what to do with arms stockpiles left from the war. The agreement also did not involve a comprehensive cease-fire, so a potential re-emergence of violence was extremely likely” (p.14). In South Sudan, small arms were sold openly in markets and most fighters were exchanging arms with foods and cloths. Even Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme embarked upon by the South Sudanese government, immediately after the Sudanese second civil war in 2005 was not successful. Most fighters did not return their arms and few arms that were returned, entered into wrong hands who stole and sold it back to the militias.

Muggah (2005) equally stated that, “...those weapons that are collected are often left in storehouses with insufficient security. The failure to truly destroy collected weapons only contributes to the recycling of arms back into civilian hand” (p.242). It should be recalled that many soldiers lost their entire families; some could not relocate the whereabouts of their family members. Child soldiers who did not acquire skill nor educated became ready-made fighters for future war. A situation of this kind, made South Sudanese crisis to be precarious. As Mueller (2013) advised “men who have been in bush – fighting for all of their lives do not easily transition away from their violent lifestyle. Adequate counselling and career services need to be in place for mobilization to work properly, or else soldiers will simply return to their life of violence by joining militant groups or crime” (p.31).

The soldiers were available for both sides and weapons were also available for them to use freely. Meanwhile, the civil war in Darfur region of Sudan was another major source of arms circulation in South Sudan. The south Sudanese rebel group acquired weapon easily from Justice and Equity Movement (JEM) militias who were also fighting government of former President Omar al Bashir in Sudan. The Lord Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group in Democratic Republic of Congo also assisted South Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition, including militias with small arms and light weapons. Arms were everywhere; people have to acquire it in order to protect themselves. These catastrophes became possible because the state had failed and its institutions had collapsed. Therefore, “in the absence of functioning police, civilians turn to arms to protect themselves, their communities and assets” (Sudan Issue Brief, 2007, p.4).

Furthermore, the fragility of the state as manifested through weak institution, equally extended to mismanagement of oil revenue. South Sudan acquired its oil wealth through Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005,

which ceded nearly all the oil wells to the South. Citing Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, Muller and Osiwa (2009) maintained that:

The CPA stated that... holders of the land rights in the oil-producing areas were to be consulted and should receive a share of benefits of oil production..., communities in these areas were to participate “in the negotiations of contracts for the development of those resources... The Wealth-Sharing Agreement obliged the government to act upon social and environmental problems resulting from oil extraction... It stipulated peoples’ right to compensation and foresaw “that at least 2 percent of oil revenue shall be allocated to the states/regions in proportion to output produced in such states (p.22).

President Salva Kiir jettisoned this agreement, rather used oil wealth to consolidate his regime. The oil producing states/regions have not been given the 2 percent nor the environmental issue taken care of by the regime. As Patey (2010) hinted, the government of South Sudan “squandered the opportunity of oil and did little to foster development in the oil producing areas. Rather than prioritizing pro-poor growth, the government of South Sudan started to build a reputation of mismanagement and fomenting local tensions...” (p.628). Oil became a curse rather than a blessing. Youths were not employed by the oil companies, partly because some of them did not acquire the necessary education that could secure them jobs in the oil companies. The basic infrastructure (such as roads, hospitals, schools, etc) which government supposed to provide through oil revenue were not available. Government officials rather, involved in “... violent contest for power, partly driven by the political elites’ desire to control the country’s oil revenues...” (International Crisis Group 2021, p.1). Oil companies (China National Petroleum Corporation, CNPC and Malaysia’s Petronas) did not also help. The Cooperate Social Responsibility (CSR) which the Comprehensive Peace Agreement obliged them to comply was not given any attention. The environmental pollution caused by the oil exploration did not bother them even a little. As Patey (2010) put it, “the oil companies were indifferent to the fact that, their operations caused substantial pollution and did little to meet the expectations for development. Consequently, grievances among the inhabitants of the oil fields grew and tension between the companies and the local population were exacerbated” (p.631).

Government of South Sudan used the oil revenue to pay military commanders and their troops and also used the money to compensate those elites that were loyal to President Kiir’s government. This was why Muller and Osiwa (2009) maintained that, “South Sudanese’s oil is a case of “Dutch Disease.” instead of using it for the development of the people, the state uses it to prosecute war against itself” (p.24). Government officials had embezzled much of the revenue and deposited them in foreign countries. It should be recalled that in 2011, President Salva Kiir wrote an appeal letter to 75 government officials and businessmen, urging them to return 4 billion United States Dollars stolen from the state treasury. This money has not been returned till date. Enough (2012) equally maintained that, “since 2011, many South Sudanese people and others have criticized the disappearance of funds from South Sudan’s coffers and called for accountability... In South Sudan’s... education and basic health care are neglected in favour of defense and large infrastructure projects because the later come with opportunities for corrupt gains” (p.12).

Similarly, International Crisis Group (2021) posited that, “weak institutional guardrails... limited oversight... fraud and embezzlement, including “ghost workers” payrolls and collusive contract schemes, ...account for billions of dollars in missing funds” (p.9). Expectedly, corruption affects both human and infrastructural development. Money that would have been channeled into the basic infrastructure (schools, hospitals, road, and communication) are now in private pockets. “This factor is a barrier to sustained peace as resources are unlikely to reach those in need, resulting in escalated tensions” (Mohammed Richter, Monk & Yamamoto, 2018, p.4).

Impact Analysis of South Sudanese Crisis

Though Horn of Africa has been globally noted as a conflict –prone zone, the South Sudanese crisis has resulted in series of impacts, which can only be imagined than experienced:

(i) Insecurity

The rate of insecurity created by the crisis in Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile states can only be compared to the crises in Afghanistan and Syria. Monaghan (2019) hinted that, “more than 4 million people have been displaced... 2.1 million forced to neighbouring countries. These include; Ethiopia (at least 418,000), Kenya (at least 111,000), Sudan (at least 543,000) and Uganda (at least 1,000,000)” (p.5).

In Greater Upper Nile region where there was a strained relationship between the Nuer pastoralists and Dinka farmers over grazing lands, the power struggle between President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar re-ignited their crisis. The herders (Nuer) attacked farmers (Dinka) with guns and machetes, killing many at United Nations’ Protection of Civilian (POC) sites in 2013. The Greater Upper Nile region that comprises Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states was the epicenter of the South Sudanese crisis. This was not accidental in view of the fact that Vice President Riek Marchar is a native of Unity state; and most of his supporters are also from Greater Upper Nile region (Monaghan, 2019).

United Nations Security Council (2018) maintained that forces loyal to the President Kiir and Vice President Machar clashed on 17th and 18th November 2017 at Wau and Mogot districts in Upper Nile state. This led to the death of 10 soldiers while others sustained injuries. On 17th December 2017 Sudan People's Liberation Army and Sudan People's Liberation Army-In Opposition clashed at Maiwut area; a Deputy Commissioner (name withheld) in Kiir's government was captured and his whereabouts is still unknown till date. On 14th December, a convey of United Nations agencies (World Health Organization and United Nations International Children and Emergency Fund) was attacked by forces loyal to President Kiir at a location between Limbe and Koya, near Yei Town in Greater Equatoria region. In the same vein, President Kiir and Vice President Machar's forces clashed at Mundni, Bongolo, Wiro and Nywa on 26th November, 2017. Both sides had casualties and residents of those areas were forced to relocate to United Nations' Protection of Civilian (POC) sites. In Bahr el Ghazal state (Agok and Momoi Bomas), government forces attacked civilians and killed many on 27th November 2017.

(ii) Humanitarian crisis

These attacks and its consequent impacts, especially famine and diseases forced South Sudanese to migrate to neighbouring countries; Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo. Those who were not able to cross border, decided to stay in Internally Displaced Persons' (ID) camp in South Sudan. As Tonleu (2018) noted, "this internal conflict has had a major impact on South Sudan, and has led to, the country becoming home to the 3rd largest refugee crisis behind Afghanistan and Syria" (p.3). In Ethiopia, there are 5 camps in Gambella that accommodated 450,000 South Sudanese refugees. Kenyan also accommodated 40,000 refugees in Kakuma Camp while Uganda received 270,000 refugees at Bidi Bidi Camp. However, problems in all the refugee camps are the same. Tonleu (2018) informed that:

Food distribution are insufficient and sometimes delayed, causing some refugees to sell non-food items to pay for food. Water supply is neither adequate nor sustainable. They rely on water trucking... boreholes are regularly out of service. The shortage of water has led to low latrine coverage, which in turn has contributed to poor sanitation and increased incidence of infection (p.3).

South Sudanese who were in Internally Displaced Persons' (IDP) camps had the worse experience. The humanitarian crisis that they have experienced can still be compared to that Syria and Afghanistan. Government and rebel forces hindered food supply intentionally, under pretext that the displaced persons are spies. They alleged that displaced persons continued informing the opposing forces, the location of their enemies. Though this allegation cannot be proven, the fact is that, food assistance from World Food Programme (WFP) are looted by the fighters for their own use. Confirming this point, Jenssen (2018) hinted that, "...government and opposition groups have blocked food supplies in certain areas, and have been looting markets and private homes for food. This has led to multiple traders running out of the markets because they are worried about possible attack" (p.4).

Those who were not displaced are equally suffering from severe food insecurity. The crisis has prevented people from farming, coupled with environmental disaster (especially drought and desertification) which the entire Horn of Africa is experiencing. "According to Food and Agricultural Organization (FOA), more than 7 million people in South Sudan (two-third of the population) ...become severely food insecure..." (Cited in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee, 2018, p.8). It should also be recalled that on 20th February, 2017, World Food Programme, declared famine in two counties (Leer and Mayendit) in Unity State. Citing Save Children (2016), Monaghan (2019) maintained that, "an estimated 1.1 million children under 5 and 672,000 pregnant and lactating women suffered from acute malnutrition in December 2017. As of November 2017, 300,000 children were on the verge of death by starvation" (p.14).

Furthermore, it is worthy to note that South Sudanese did not have good medical care, before the crisis erupted in 2013. "When it gained independence in 2011, South Sudan had about 120 doctors and 100 nurses for a population of more than 9 million people. There were few clinics and hospitals, particularly outside major cities and town" (Monaghan, 2019 p.13). Therefore, the situation became worse, immediately the crisis erupted in 2013. Between 2013 to 2017 many South Sudanese suffered series of illnesses caused by displacement, as well as destruction of water and sanitation facilities. According to Tonleu (2018) confirmed that;

Communicable and water diseases are spreading at an alarming rate. Multiple disease outbreaks including measles, meningitis and Rift valley fever, have been reported throughout the country in 2018. The country suffered a cholera outbreak between June 2016 and February 2018. There were an estimated 20,000 cases, leading to 436 deaths... The country has very few medical facilities... these facilities are underequipped and lack adequate staffing, with only 1 doctor for every 100,000 people (p.5).

(iii) Human Rights Abuses

Similarly, human rights abuse that associated with South Sudanese crisis requires further exposure. Women and children were the victims of those abuses that includes; sexual exploitation, rape, child soldier, education denial, gender based violence, sexual violence among others. Even before the crisis erupted in South Sudan, girls were given out for

marriage, at tender age. They were not allowed to go to school in some communities. Girls were seen as a source of income generation for the family. The South Sudanese crisis worsen situation. United Nations General Assembly (2018) alerted that, “the ongoing conflict in South Sudan, coupled with family facing severe economic hardship have resulted in young girls being forced into marriage” (p.29). However, those forced into marriage were lucky, most women and girls were raped in forests while looking for firewood. Some were raped in Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDP) camps by soldiers loyal to government as well as rebel groups. A South Sudanese refugee (woman) testified before Centre for Justice and Peace, organized by United Nations General Assembly in 2017 on her rape case. According to her (name withheld):

We were around 25 women excluding children, we were in SPLA-(IO) controlled area... their commander... told us to go through... forest until we reach Guit. We move through the forest as he said, but on our way we met a group of soldiers for SPLA-IO who order us to stop and take away all our things and money and decided to rape us. All of us were raped there in the forest, except one woman who was killed because she refused to be raped (Cited in United Nations General Assembly, 2018, p.29).

According to Morley (2017) cited in Nault and Levitt (2017) South Sudan is “the worst place in the world to be a child” (p.12). About 1,800 children have died due to the conflict, and many more have lost parents. They become bread winner at a tender age and lived among adults. Some children have abandoned schools, due to the crisis and become child soldiers. Scott (2017) hinted further that 70 percent of refugees from South Sudan are younger than 18 years. In Scott’s (2017) opinion, “we are seeing now a very real threat of another lost generation of South Sudanese youth” (cited in Nault & Levitt 2017, p.12). Some of these children are recruited into armed groups either by the government forces or rebels. United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (2017) reported that about 17,000 children in South Sudan are members of armed group.

(iv) Economic Crisis

The economic underdevelopment which South Sudan is still experiencing could be attributed to the civil war. Oil that had contributed to more than 90 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stopped flowing due to disagreement with Sudan over transportation charges to Port Sudan, since 2011. Regrettably, the crisis that erupted in December 2013, immediately after Sudan agreed to accept South Sudanese government transporting its oil through Port Sudan to Red Sea was a set back to its economic recovery. President Kiir had collected loan from China, hoping that South Sudan would pay back through oil-swap. International Crisis Group (2014) lamented that, “an emergency shutdown took place in Unity State fields... oil workers were evacuated; in the Upper Nile fields...” (p.16).

South Sudanese government was unable to redeem its promise to China, even payment of salaries to its army and public servants was impossible. In the same vein, China had invested 2 billion United State Dollars in building oil infrastructure, and had signed contracts with President Kiir’s government for the construction of road in major cities in South Sudan; especially Juba, Yambio, Yei, Wau among others. China became the greatest loser, since the security situation in South Sudan could not permit construction to be done in any of those cities. As International Crisis Group (2014) hinted, “China’s frustration with government is evident. The war has brought... oil production shutdown... destroyed or made many Chinese businesses unviable... forced oil company workers to seek shelter in UN bases...” (p.17).

The economic development in South Sudan suffered serious blow due to disruption in oil revenue. The South Sudanese pound lost 90% of its value, compared to United States Dollar due to exchange rate liberation policy adopted by government in 2015. Nyadera (2018) added that, “in 2016 inflation surpassed 550% increase rate, leaving the government with over 1.1 billion United States Dollar deficit in the 2016-2017 financial year” (p.64). The economic performance of South Sudan could be described as the worst in the entire Africa. The country has experienced hyperinflation due to the crisis. “Hyperinflation has increased the level of poverty and has raised food prices... in only a year, poverty in urban areas has increased from 49 percent in 2015 to 70 percent in 2016... increasing gap between food prices and income levels” (Mohammed, Richter, Monk & Yamamoto, 2018, p.4). The World Bank (2018) also alerted that South Sudan, “has extremely high infant mortality (59.2 deaths per 1000 birth) and material mortality rates (789 deaths per 100,000 births) compared with the rest of the world” (cited in Mohammed, Richter, Monk & Yamamoto, 2018, p.4). In the same vein, Oxfam (2018) decried that nearly all the villages in Central Equatoria were burned completely by the warring parties. “Even if people feel safe to return home, their homes and livelihoods cannot be rebuilt overnight” (Oxfam 2018, p.4). Traders equally lamented that, there was nothing to buy in the war raven areas especially, Central Equatoria, Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei States. International Crisis Group (2014) cited a mother of four kids who went to market to buy food stuff in Jonglei, regrettably, came back with nothing. According to her “at the market, there is nothing for us, there is only beer, milk and bullets for soldiers” (cited in International Crisis Group, 2014, p.28).

Foreign Intervention in South Sudanese Crisis

Having created on 9th July 2011, the United Nations Organization realized that the new state; South Sudan, must surely have institution that will ensure protection of lives and property. This realization led to the establishment of United

Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) on 11th July 2011. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was mandated to assist the new state in building institutions for effective take-off of the government. However, immediately the crisis erupted on 15th December 2013, the UNMISS was forced to “shift from partnering with the government and its security forces to protecting civilians fleeing abuses by those same forces” (Well, 2017, p.14).

The UNMISS created a buffer zone within its base on Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States; commonly known as Protection of Civilians (POC) sites, where Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) could be secured. Regrettably, the government of South Sudan accused UNMISS of siding the rebel, hence prevented the displaced persons from getting access to the sites. Well (2017) noted further that, “as UNMISS focused on protection, the government increasingly treated the mission as an adversary ... government officials have accused UNMISS of taking sides, and UN staff, including civilians, have faced harassment and physical violence” (p.14). Despite this accusation, on 13th February 2018, 204,247 internally displaced persons were protected in UNMISS sites. “This included 114,245 in Bentiu, 28,113 in Juba, 24,417 in Malafal, 2,296 in Bor and 25,176 in Wau” (United Nations Security Council, 2018, p.8). In 2017, UNMISS collaborated with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and brokered peace between Misseriya (pastoralists) and Dinka Malual (farmers) in Aweil East. It also collaborated with youths in Yambio and Terit for the purpose of preventing crisis spreading into their areas.

Similarly, Inter Governmental Authority on Development equally intervened on 23rd January 2014. President Kiir and Vice President Machar were invited for peace talks at Addis Ababa. The emphasis at this early stage of the meeting was on the cessation of hostilities and the release of the eleven political detainees who were accused of plotting coup d’eta by President Kiir. Government Insisted that the opposition must stop the hostilities before they could release the political detainees. However, International Crisis Group (2014) recorded that, “neither the government nor the SPLM/A in opposition have complied with the cessation of hostilities” (p.20). Another round of talks was organized in February and March 2014, which eventually led to the release of seven detainees (SPIM-7) remaining four (4). The released detainees later joined Machar’s group in future talks with Kiir’s group. Regional body, African Union (AU) equally intervened in the crisis. On 26th December, the AU Peace and Security Council met at Addis Ababa and deliberated extensively on the security situation in South Sudan.

The human rights abuse that associated with the crisis was issue of concern for all member states; hence, a Commission of Inquiry to investigate human rights abuse was established in March 2014. Nigerian former President Olusegun Obasanjo was mandated to chair the Commission of Inquiry and report back to the African Union (AU). In his submission on behalf of African Union Commission in South Sudan (AUCISS), Obasanjo accused the government of South Sudan of neglecting its basic responsibility and allowing the killings to spree throughout December, 16, 17, 18, 2013. According to Blanchard (2016), “the AUCISS documented subsequent atrocities by both sides, often targeting civilians from rival ethnic communities as well as the use of hate speech and incitement to violence, and described gang rape as a common feature of the abuses committed”(p.8). The government of South Sudan rejected the report and described it as partial and mingling in internal affairs of a sovereign state (International Crisis Group, 2014, Blanchard, 2016).

Furthermore, United States of America that aided the creation of the new state, South Sudan in 2011 did not watch the anarchy continuing unabated. In May 2014, the former United States’ President, Obama signed Executive Order 3664 that imposed sanctions on Sudan People’s Liberation Army Commander, Paul Malong as well as Johnson Olony, the Commander of Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army in Opposition. In September 2017, the United States government under the leadership of President Trump, announced a targeted sanction against South Sudanese officials, due to the role they played in threatening peace, security and stability of South Sudan. The officials were Benjamin Bol Mel (President Kiir’s Principal Financial Adviser), Malik Reuben Rengu (Deputy Chief of Defence and Inspector General of the Sudan People Liberation Army), Michael Makuei Lueth (Minister of Information, Communication Technology and Postal Services), and Lieutenant General Paul Malong Awan (Chief of General Staff of Sudan People Liberation Army). The United Nations also imposed sanctions on selected soldiers who were advisers to President Kiir such as Lieutenant Generla Gabriel Jok Gak, Major General Marial Chanuog, Yol Mangok, Major General Santino Deng Wol. Similarly, Lieutenant General Simon Gatweeh Dual, Lieutenant General James Koang Chuol Ranley and Major General Peter Gatdata Jaka who were Vice President Machar loyalists were equally sanctioned. Enough (2019) revealed further that in December 2018, United States’ Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned President Kiir’s brother in-law, Gregory Vasill for his role in the conflict as well as looting of South Sudanese Treasury (SST).

Canadian government has also assisted in mitigating the impacts of the crisis, since it erupted on 15th December 2013. “The government of Canada’s multi-faceted engagement includes; the provision of humanitarian aid development assistance, contribution of personnel to UNMISS and the engagement with the peace process led by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)” (Nault and Levitt, 2017, p.7). It should be recalled that, between 2015 to 2016, the government of Canada contributed 25 million United States Dollars in humanitarian assistance to

South Sudan. On 17th March 2017, the Canadian government further pledged 37 million United States Dollars in humanitarian assistance for South Sudanese refugees in the neighbouring states; Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan. According to Nault and Levitt (2017), Canadian government also involved in development assistance to South Sudan. The development assistance focused on access to quality health services particularly for girls and women as well as reduction on food insecurity. It has partnered with World Food Programme (WFP) in training farmers on “Food-for-Work” Programme as well as providing them with improved agricultural inputs.

In addition, Uganda saved Juba from the rebels’ occupation in January, 2014. President Kiir requested for immediate military assistance from President Museveni of Uganda, in order to protect the capital (Juba) and the oil installations in Unity, Jonglei as well as Upper Nile States. President Kiir also invited Justice and Equity Movement (JEM), a rebel group in Sudan to join militias in Equatoria who were fighting Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition. In fact, their presence was a big help in protecting oil installations in the rebel occupied areas; Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile States. As Blanchard (2016) reported, “... Uganda deployed troops into South Sudan early in the conflict at Kiir’s request to protect key infrastructure and state stability... Uganda continue to facilitate the transfer of defense equipment to the government in Juba” (p.15). Though the presence of Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) had been a hindrance to quick resolution of the crisis, government justified its position on ground that rebels were supported by Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). International Crisis Group (2014) confirmed that:

In December 2013, the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) was deployed beside the SPLA, as part of regional force to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the one-time Ugandan insurgency that is causing chaos in the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan... “if it weren’t for the UPDF deployment, there wouldn’t be talks in Addis, there would be urban warfare for control of Juba” (p.24).

Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group in the Great Lake Region, under the leadership of Joseph Kony has been a notorious group whose evils have no bound. It posed serious threat to the entire region. In march 2006, United Nation Security Council, directed its mission (United Nation Mission-UNMIS) to “make full use of its... mandate and capabilities in dealing with the LRA and other armed groups posing threat to civilians” (International Crisis Group, 2007, p.12).

In the same vein, Sudan, the immediate neighbours to South Sudan had been supportive to the government of South Sudan. However, President Kiir’s invitation to Justice and Equity Movement (JEM), and the territorial struggle over Abyei constituted serious challenge to their relationship. As International Crisis Group (2014) noted, “many are worrying that Sudan may publicly support the government while aiding the SPLA-in Opposition” (p.24). Despite this, Sudan was still playing an active role in Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), for the purpose of bringing lasting peace in South Sudan. In the same vein, Ethiopia had been a strong supporter of President Kiir. It hosted the peace talks in January, February and March, 2013 at its capital, Addis Ababa. Ethiopia has worked closely with Sudan People’s Liberation Army on joint border security initiative alongside with Kenya and Eritrea. President Kiir has been a close friend of former President Arab Moi of Kenya whose effort to end the crisis in South Sudan cannot be measured.

Regrettably, Eritrea has been accused of supporting the rebel, due to ethnic identity. Majority of Eritreans are Nuer. As International Crisis Group (2014) confirmed, “since 2005, elements within Eritrea have provided substantial support to the southern armed groups” (p.26). Though President Afwerki has vehemently denied it, the fact is that Eritrea is still a member of Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), therefore, its role in the South Sudanese crisis is full of controversies.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The joy for new-born state vanished immediately war erupted on 15th December, 2013 between presidential guards loyal to President Kiir and Vice President Machar. The killings that targeted the two major ethnic groups, Dinka and Nuer quickly spread from Juba to nook and cranny of the entire state, despite initial efforts to restrain it to Juba. Finding revealed that political exclusion, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, corruption and weak institutions were the driving forces that triggered grievance in South Sudan. These grievances that resulted in civil war had impacted negatively on security, human rights, humanitarian needs as well as economy. International community especially; United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), African Union Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS), United States, Canada, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea had intervened since 2014.

Though Vice President Riek Machar had returned back to Juba on 20th February 2020 following peace accord between him and the President Salva Kiir brokered by Inter Governmental Authority in Addis Ababa, Peace in South Sudan is fragile. The anxiety at the international space is the forthcoming general election, which is scheduled in 2024.

The principal actors; President Salva Kiir and his Vice President, Riek Machar are ready to contest. There is fear that there will be another round of crisis immediately the winner is declared by the electoral body. In order to avert the expected crisis, the study recommends:

- (i) **Rotational Presidency:** South Sudan needs to amend its constitution to accommodate rotational presidency. Findings revealed that there are two major ethnic groups; Dimka and Nuer; the rest are minority. Power should revolve among the three. Each should be entitled to five years' tenure. Nigeria has adopted this model. Power continues to rotate between north and south since Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999. Even Tanzania rotates power between Muslim and Christians. It has help in reducing unnecessary struggle among power elites. International Crisis Group (2021) added that, "South Sudan could adopt a similar rotational policy... It could encourage multi-ethnic alliance or mean losers of elections feel; they have a shot at the presidency next time around" (p.20). The rotational policy should not only stop at presidency, but should extend to other public offices in both civilian and military institutions. This will reduce grievances and promote integration among the ethnic groups in South Sudan.
- (ii) **Devolution of Power:** The amended constitution which should be effected before the commencement of general election in 2024 must devolve power. The centre has occupied all, while the components are left with nothing. The struggle for power in South Sudan is triggered by the corruption that associate with oil revenue. This should not be so, if South Sudan was practicing true federalism. Those states (Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile) that produce oil should have full control over their resources. They should pay certain percentage of tax to the centre. Oil in South Sudan does not belong to the state (South Sudan) but to the people of the locality that own the land. This is the mistake Nigerian government is making, hence Niger Delta Crisis continue lingering unabated despite the 13 percent derivation formula enshrined in Nigerian constitution. The locality oil is exploited is the only area that would face environmental hazards that associate with oil exploitation not the entire country. States without oil can also engage in agriculture and mining activities to sustain itself. This would bring effective competition and foster even development. International Crisis Group (2021) equally advised that, "... devolution could bring South Sudanese together by creating a clear settlement on shared governance... would also give space for South Sudan's massive United Nations Mission and other donors to redouble peace building efforts on the ground which are increasingly derailed by national deadlock" (p.24).
- (iii) **Mental Disarmament:** Presently, South Sudan is awash with small arms and light weapons. Government of South Sudan and the rebel groups cannot account for weapons that are in the hands of the militias. Even the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme of the government and the regional body; Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has failed. Those with unauthorized arms continue keeping it to protect themselves and their families against future crisis. Some are using it for robbery and inter communal crisis. South Sudanese government has reneged in its promises to resettle the militia. Therefore, the situation now is the same when compare to the period of that crisis. The only solution now is for the people to be educated on the need to live in peace with one another. Political leaders, religious leaders, civil society organizations, international donors have part to play in educating the people. As Mueller (2013) stated, "the focus is on changing the mindset of the population to acknowledge that weapons are not solutions to problems..." (p.32). Peace education should be part of the school curriculum, which must be taught from primary school to university in South Sudan. This would change the mindset and bring the needed peace to the people. Rwanda adopted peace education as a tool to combat 1994 genocide. The relative peace Rwanda is having now comes as a result of peace education. This could also work in South Sudan if adopted.
- (iv) **Development Assistance:** Presently, poverty is the worst enemy of the South Sudanese people. South Sudan is one of the poorest among the poor in the whole world, it ranked 169th out of 188 in Human Development Index (Tonleu, 2018). The 40 years' war has devastated the entire state and their leaders are not ready to learn any lesson. They are busy struggling for power while the people continue to remain poorer. Unemployment, hunger, diseases, illiteracy, insecurity are the daily experience of an average South Sudanese. The world should not abandon them. International donors; World Health Organization, International Monetary Fund, United Nations International Children Emergency Fund, World Food Organization, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees among others should continue supporting the new born state, South Sudan. They are helping humanity. The truth is that "South Sudan's finances are in ruins... country's leaders have emptied the state's coffers, siphoning off its oil income and mortgaging future oil revenue" (International Crisis Group, 2021, p.21). Time to assist is now.

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